Q General Casey testified today that securing Baghdad would take fewer than half the additional troops that President Bush has proposed, and he said that he had asked for two brigades, based on the recommendations of his subordinate commanders. So how did we wind up with five additional brigades?
MR. SNOW: Well, the President has talked with — you also know that General Casey supports the plan. And the plan is to bring in five brigades into Baghdad, and also another 4,000 Marines into Anbar, not only to take care of immediate security concerns, but to make sure that we have adequate force structure as the Iraqis begin bringing brigades into each of the nine districts of Baghdad, and the Americans also into those nine districts, in support, that we have adequate resources and forces to deal not only with the media, but also potential threats to security.
Q But why the disparity in numbers? When he’s talking on the Hill about asking for two, and the President asked for five?
MR. SNOW: Well, there were a number of conversations, and the President, after talking with General Casey and other commanders, came to the conclusion that he preferred to have five brigades into Baghdad and 4,000 Marines into Anbar. And again, what General Casey was talking about is some suggestions he’d made earlier. The President has made his decision, and it does reflect the wisdom of a number of combatant commanders. And again, it does have the assent of General Casey.
Q Let me get one more. General Casey, do you think that he’s kind of been all over the park on this? He’s first of all, said that additional troops weren’t warranted, and then he went along with the President, and now he’s saying this?
MR. SNOW: No, I think what you’ve had is you had a shifting series of circumstances within Baghdad.
[snip]
Q Can I just go back to the question about General Casey and the brigade, saying he felt fewer than half of what the President has planned were needed. You say he supports the plan now. He says he does, but it seems like a very diplomatic way to say, not really, and I don’t have to be there to carry it out. So who did the President rely on heavily when he made these decisions? The commander on the ground did not, it appears, agree with the President’s bigger, larger plan for more brigades. The commander of Central Command apparently did not. So the President relied mostly on outside people, or the people who he was trying to get to go in —
MR. SNOW: I’ve often been asked about internal deliberations, and I’ve always given the same answer, which is, I’m not going to characterize them. It is worth noting that General Abizaid and General Casey, both of whom you’ve described as being in opposition to the plan, publicly have supported it. And so I’ll let you —
Q But what he said today didn’t quite fit that, Tony.
MR. SNOW: I’d refer the questions back to him and I let him clarify.